and communication, have largely been solved. We can look forward to increasing technical triumphs provided we are able to master the maladjustments in human relations resulting from technological change. At the present time, little attempt is made even to use what we already know in dealing with such problems. Only when the science of human relations becomes as fully developed as the older natural sciences can we hope to eliminate sources of individual maladjustment, bring about harmonious relations between the many groups making up a single nation, work out more effective and democratic systems of government, and extend their sway to the relationships between nations. Only with such a science can the basic problem of our civilization be solved - how to increase our human adjustment and at the same time to increase our technological efficiency. It is the hope of the members of the Society for Applied Anthropology that this journal will assist in this development.

For these reasons, APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY will publish only articles which contribute to the solution of practical problems. In many cases, the results of a research may not be immediately applicable for reasons outside the control of the investigators. But in all cases, the practical uses of the work must be clearly stated, and a method outlined by which the results of the investigation could be applied. In the early issues, we expect that there will be a greater number of articles in which no test of the author's diagnosis was carried out; before very long we hope to be able to publish a majority of articles in which an account is given of the way recommendations were arrived at and what the results were of putting them into operation. We are interested in failures as well as successes, provided an attempt is made to show what the reasons were for the failures. Primarily, then APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY is designed not only for scientists, but even more for those concerned with putting plans into operation, administrators, psychiatrists, social workers, and all those who as part of their responsibility have to take action in problems of human relations.

ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS IN INDUSTRY

Eliot D. Chapple

At the present time, under the stress of preparing for national defense, the public is becoming increasingly familiar with some of the problems of industry. Before we became aware of the degree to which our national existence depended on the efficiency of our industrial plant, our attitude towards industry and its products was much like that of a child with a toy electric train. We thought that it was wonderful that such things could be made, but we were liable to believe that the process of production involved only a single step from the discovery by Edison of the electric light to the finished 75-watt bulb we put in our reading lamp. We had little knowledge of any intervening stages.

We are at last beginning to learn something about what goes on inside factory walls. We have discovered that months are required to draft the plans for a new tank or a bombing plane, that production depends upon machine tools and upon jigs and dies, about which we have heard for the first time. We are beginning to be familiar with the complex problems of obtaining and transporting raw materials, the need for priorities, and the limitations on the speed with which the parts of a product can be manufactured. The term "bottleneck" has come into common use. But what we have learned has all been in terms of materials and machines and buildings; we are still ignorant of the part played by human beings in the industrial effort. This aspect of industry, called organization, the way in which people have to work together, is fundamental - without organization, blueprints could not be prepared, materials assembled for processing, work distributed among different operators, nor the quality and quantity of the work controlled. Without organization, in fact, industry could not exist.

But organization consists of far more than a technical system of organized work routines; it also includes the way in which labor and management adjust to one another within the framework provided by these routines. Ordinarily, we tend to think of these two aspects of organization as if they were in separate compartments. When strikes or threats of strikes occur, we seem to believe that the causes are somehow divorced from the working conditions in the plants in question. Strikes are, therefore, blamed on "outside agitators", whether communist or otherwise, as if these remarkable beings could turn happy and contented workers overnight into dissatisfied advocates of violence. If this explanation is not used, the "economic" interpretation generally is. Here demands for higher wages are always considered of primary importance, and the "grievances" arising from working conditions of little or no sig-

nificance. We like to believe that workers demand higher wages in automatic response to every change in economic indices, as if every worker, unlike ourselves, is an economic calculating machine bereft of human feelings and human attitudes. In the former case, the treatment prescribed is "throw the rascals out"; in the latter, high wages are regarded as the solution. Since there is little interest in finding out why this type of approach just doesn't work, the public, as well as many members of management, go on discussing labor problems in terms of how they think workers ought to act, rather than how they actually do act.

In other fields, where organization plays a part, we are not so naive. The most dramatic and the one about which we know the most is in sports. Baseball and football teams present the most familiar examples of organizations where the interrelation of the work routines (the plays) is dependent upon the careful adjustment of players to one another and to the coaches. In these sports, complicated plays and split-second coordination cannot be executed unless the organization is made up of individuals well adjusted to one another. The job of the coach is to see that this is done; to select a series of plays best fitted to the capacities of his material and to fit together players who can supplement each other's abilities. To get a smooth-working organization, he must handle personalities skillfully so that good teamwork becomes almost second nature. As a result, the experts and the fans discuss learnedly whether coach A is getting the most out of his material, whether catcher B can handle his pitchers, whether star C is wrecking the morale of the team.

Industrial organizations are like teams, but vastly more complicated. The same factors of plays and personalities combine to make an organization, and the adjustment that goes on from day to day determines whether the company is to have effective teamwork or will constantly suffer from personnel dissatisfaction, labor disputes and inefficiency. To understand industry, we have to think of each company as a team and apply much the same criteria we use in evaluating the team. But for practical purposes we need to do more than that. We have to use some method of obtaining information about the organization on the basis of which decisions can be made. For management cannot hope to have the same kind of relations with its employees that a coach does with his players; such intimate association between all the members of a large organization is impossible.

In the fields of production and finance, subjective methods have long since been relegated to the dust bin. When a new machine is to be purchased, the company's engineers make a careful analysis of its performance, what its limitations are, what the cost situation is going to be, and how the machine is to be fitted into the rest of the production system. After it has been installed, careful records are kept of its actual performance in terms of cost and output, and excellent methods have been developed to maintain control over the quality of its manufactured product. The same thing is unfortunately not true for organization problems. When it comes to planning out the relations of the people in a new assembly line, or when it comes to the question of fitting a man into the supervisory hierarchy, no similar analysis is undertaken. With few exceptions, it is assumed that people can be persuaded to do anything. Moreover, if any analysis should be made of a departmental situation, it is never considered necessary to do so more than once. There is little realization of the fact that the amount of teamwork displayed by any organization is constantly varying, and that it does not follow that because you are satisfied with the teamwork displayed today that tomorrow or two months from now your organization will have anything like the same efficiency.

The reasons for this lack of planning and control are various, but the principal one is that up until recently, organization was not seen as the basic factor in determining industrial efficiency. Rather it was believed to be something about which one did not need to trouble, a natural consequence if one possessed the most efficient technical processes. Only gradually was it discovered that up-to-date machinery is no guarantee of effective teamwork. The efforts of management were largely devoted to perfecting technical methods, and organization was relegated to the sidelines. It was important, but no one knew quite what to do with it. There was much, however, to be unlearned.

The more advanced members of management are learning that many of the logical systems developed to deal with organization problems fall down because of a basic fallacy in their construction. This fallacy is the acceptance without verification of certain arbitrary assumptions about how human beings ought to behave, even when all the evidence, if anyone cares to look for it, is contrary to the belief. Great store has been placed on complicated incentive systems, for instance, in which the worker is expected to calculate the relative advantages of working in a group piece-rate system as opposed to an

individual piece-rate system, or is supposed to estimate the rate at which his bonus increases with his output and to change his behaviour accordingly. Recent research, notably that at the Western Electric Company plant in Hawthorne*, has shown that workers do not behave as these ingenious schemes assume, and consequently they fail to accomplish what they set out to do.

To a large extent, this is as far as we have gone in the field of organization. There has been little more than academic recognition of the fact that efficient organization is only obtainable if the personalities of people and the limitations on their personality are taken as equally fundamental to the capacities and limitations of machines and cost-accounting systems. Management has frequently been engaged in an earnest effort to shove square pegs in round holes, and it is little wonder that frequent splinters in the form of personnel and labor conflicts have resulted.

Management is not entirely to blame for this situation. Whereas expert and scientific advice is available in machine design, cost accounting, etc., practically no one has been primarily concerned with organization. As one might expect, the best work has been done by men in the management movement, but their efforts have been largely impeded because there were no techniques or general principles at hand which could be applied to the study of organization structure.

Almost entirely, management has depended upon the use of organization charts as a method of defining the relations of departments to one another and has also supplemented these charts by what are called standard practice instructions or administrative orders. Anyone who has had to use organization charts knows that very little which corresponds to the operating realities of the company is included on them. There are a series of dependent boxes, each of which refers to an officer or department, connected together by lines. Some attempt is made to indicate what the duties of a department are by writing in a few qualifying terms to add to the title. Under the Promotion Department, for example, there may be written such subsidiary functions "general publicity", "development of new markets", and "advertising", while the Engineering Department may have as one of its duties, "giving advice to customers". In fact, there is overlapping and potential conflict between the two departments in their relationships to the customers, and no attempt is made to define the limits of these relations. Any solution is dependent upon the adjustments or lack of them between the two departments.

In a company of any size, any determined effort to put on an organization chart all the relations of one department to the others is doomed to failure by the limitations of the graphical techniques employed and by the lack of any system in obtaining the relevant information. Either the chart is covered by a fine network of lines and is indecipherable, or the elimination of all but the direct lines of authority between departments makes it almost useless for anything more than decorative purposes.

The result is that every company supplements the organization chart or replaces it with "administrative orders" in which these relationships are described in words. When they try to lay down general rules for behaviour they suffer from the fact that they are not based upon an operating picture of the company but rather on what some members of management think it ought to be, and with rare exceptions the terms used are more nearly wishes than realities. A statement such as "the Sales Department will cooperate with the Advertising Department, the Service Department and the Order Department" merely indicates that there is presumably some sort of relation between some members of these four departments, but what it is, or how cooperate is to be defined, is left unspecified.

If a workable solution of these difficulties is to be obtained, we have to begin with the realities of the organizational structure. First of all, we have to recognize that organizations are made up of people, and that people behave in accordance with physiological laws. These laws, for all practical purposes, are well worked out. They concern the way in which human beings, as well as other organisms, respond to changes in their environment.*

When these changes occur suddenly, profound modifications of the internal workings of the body occur which are combined with marked behavioural changes. The heart begins to beat faster, increasing the rate of circulation of the blood, breathing becomes quicker, adrenalin is pumped into the blood, increased energy in the form of blood sugar is liberated to be carried to the various organs. These changes in the rates of activity of various bodily processes, together with others not mentioned here, we experience subjectively as "emotion". They rep-

*Roethlisberger, F.J. and Dickson, W.J. *Management and the Worker.* Cambridge: 1939.

*Cannon, W.B. *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.* New York: Appleton (1936).

resent a fundamental reflex pattern by which changes in the autonomic nervous system which controls these activities are set in motion when the organism is endangered (that is, faced with sudden change). In the newborn child, these reflex patterns can be set off with a very slight stimulus; in the adult, except under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, the full-fledged character of these responses is not so easily produced. We have learned (been conditioned) not to be completely "emotional" in response to any sudden stimulus. Nevertheless, we still react in some degree to the stimulus though very often we may not be aware that we do so.

In moderately strong stimulating situations, the higher centers of the brain where our learned habits of behaviour are activated lose their mastery, and the lower centers which set off these emotional reflex patterns take over. When we are emotionally disturbed, we lose our capacity for finely patterned discriminations; we are unable to have normal adjustments to other people, and we lose our capacity for coordination. Only when the disturbance is over do our bodily processes return approximately to their previous rates, and this characteristic return is evidence that the body is in a state of equilibrium.

All of us have experienced these emotional reactions (even though we may know very little about the physiological changes which are responsible for them), yet we may not know that these occur automatically in response to any sudden change in the environment. Our environment is made up to a very large extent of other people, and it is they who provide almost all the situations which disturb our equilibrium. If successive disturbances occur with a fairly high frequency, we may experience the full-fledged reflex pattern. We lose our heads or our tempers, and we may find it harder the next time to return to a state of equilibrium.

The state of equilibrium itself is marked by an orderly series of responses in our environment to which we have become habituated. If the regular round of eating, sleeping, working, goes on without interruption or disturbance, we experience pleasur-sensations, again produced by these bodily activities under the control of another branch of the autonomic nervous system. We tend therefore to try to maintain ourselves in environments where this experience can take place, and each of us differs to some degree in the kind of environment that we need. The significance of these properties in dealing with organization problems is readily apparent if we consider the part played by the technical processes in the organizational structure.

Organization consists of the system of relations of the individuals in the factory. These relations are to a large extent routines, that is, they occur regularly and are dependent upon the requirements of the technological methods employed. They are, however, not merely the routines making up the actual process of manufacture; they are also the routine procedures of keeping records, supervising and handling material. Each of these routines necessitates a relationship between two or more persons; a record system, for example, cannot be understood except by considering the people who have to operate it. A request for a machine part from inventory concerns the person who makes the request, the man who carries the order, and the inventory clerk who passes on the request. Organization does not, therefore, concern itself with the color of the paper on which the order is sent but rather in the routines which prescribe what individuals are to be related to one another in terms of the movement of the order.

In any factory, changes occur in these routines from hour to hour and from day to day under the minor crises incident to any manufacturing process; a machine breaks down, material is temporarily held up; the foreman is called off the floor into conference with his boss. Each of these changes involves a change in the relations of persons. The worker calls the attention of the foreman to the machine breakdown, and he in turn calls the maintenance department. A failure to obtain materials from another department may change the routine relations between all the individuals in the delayed department and the consequence of the foreman's conference with his boss may not merely mean a cessation in the frequency of his supervision but may also involve changes in the work routines of the department.

Not merely do these minor changes occur but also larger changes: the ebb and flow of orders from customers which affect production rates or the installation of a new manufacturing process which requires the learning of new relationships and a displacement of old or the profound modifications involved in large scale lay-offs or taking on new workers. Each of these changes, whether temporary or permanent, whether affecting a single individual or many, involves a disturbance of the equilibrium of the individuals. It therefore produces emotional reactions which occur automatically as a result of the disturbance.

The changes in behaviour which result when the individuals are seeking to return to their pre-

vious routines have to be taken into consideration within the organizational structure. If the management itself acts as a disturbing force in taking executive action, the cumulated disturbances may set up reactions which prevent the organization from returning to its previous state. An efficient organization is one in which adjustments to change take place automatically within normal limits because the organization is so designed that disturbances are quickly brought under control.

If we look upon organization, therefore, as a system of relations of individuals in which the actual contacts imposed by particular technical processes provide the framework within which people have to reach an equilibrium, it can be seen that the frequency and extent of disturbing situations will determine the kind of teamwork which will result. Thus by making a detailed study of the frequency of these contacts, the degree to which adjustment takes place between the individuals, and the amount of change which takes place as a result of the operation of the organization, we can set up a system of control by which organization problems can be dealt with objectively. If we begin with even the existing organization chart and try to fill it in terms of the relations of particular people to one another, we can rapidly determine differences in the workings of the organization which could not be determined by any other means.

In an organization chart, it is immediately obvious that the vertical arrangement of the boxes defining individuals and departments has some kind of behavioural significance. The head of the company is always at the top and the workers at the bottom. In actual field observation we find that actions flow in a definite order which is more or less similar to that on the chart. The president of the company acts and his department heads respond. They in turn act and their sub-executives respond, and so on down the line. By using such simple discriminations as the order in which people act, the frequency with which these actions take place in a given relationship, the degree of adjustment between the individuals, and the length of time such interactions last (each of which is at the same time a measure of physiological activity) we begin to get a much more accurate picture of an organization than we have had hitherto. Merely in following out the lines of supervision we can start to differentiate between organizations which on a conventional organization chart present the same appearance. In one company, the flow of traffic between the president and his immediate subordinates may be very great, so great that there is a marked break in the relations of these subordinates to the members of their departments. On the other hand, on the level of the foremen, we may find that they initiate action very frequently for the workers in their departments or conversely that they interact much more frequently with their division chiefs.

Following out the organization chart we find that there are a number of departments in staff or functional relationships to the line of production as sales, accounting, maintenance, personnel, and so on. By making similar observations on the relations between the members of these departments and the members of the production department, we begin to get a much more accurate picture of what each line on the organization chart connecting two departments, or a statement that two departments shall cooperate, means in practice. We frequently find that staff departments in one company, or even within the branches of the same company, have marked differences in their relationships. In one company, all staff contacts go through the foreman of the operating department; in others there is a high frequency of direct contacts. Some staff departments are continually acting upon the foreman, while others only appear on the scene after a number of requests by the foreman. By applying these discriminations of order in which actions travel, of frequency, of duration alone, we can begin to get a picture of the organization which corresponds to operating reality. We are outlining the character of the emotional adjustments within the organization, but if this were all we could do, our picture would not have too much value, even though we could say this is what the company looked like as of Friday, May 2. For what we are really interested in is how to make the company organization more efficient. What are the sources of difficulty in the organization, and how can they be remedied? To do this, we have to watch the operation of the organization from day to day and set up a system of control.

Every organization at some time or other reaches a state of balance, or inertia, such that when minor disturbances take place in some of the relations of its members, due to the effect of outside forces, the system of routines tends to return to the state it was in before the disturbance occurred. When this happens, the organization is said to be in a state of equilibrium. Now the tendency of an organization to reach equilibrium is complicated by the fact that, as we have seen, each individual in it has his own requirements for equilibrium, although the balance which he attains as a result of the ad-

justment of the requirements of his activity rates, is only partially contained within the organization. Thus most people are members of several organizations in the technical sense, aside from the industry in which they are employed. They are members of families, churches, political parties, clubs, and so on, and the equilibrium they attain is a balance between all these systems of relations.

Nevertheless, in analyzing any given organization, these other relationships can be disregarded in a first approximation until the pattern of the relationships of the organization has been worked out. It may then be found that outside institutions such as the family may at a given time be the disturbing force, for example, where rapidly increasing cost of living upsets the routines by which the family maintains its equilibrium. In that case, no matter how stable the factory system has become, it may be subject to serious disturbances through the relations of the workers to wives, children, and other relatives.

To set up a control system for an organization, the following procedures need to be followed:

1) The organization must be first broken up into its actual operating departments and sub-departments, each of which forms a demonstrably isolated group as determined by the fact that with the exception of a few individuals, the frequency of contacts is greater within the group than between its members and the members of other groups.

2) From observations taken in each of these departments, a plan should be made of the actual individuals who are in contact with each other, the order in which the individuals act, the frequency of the contacts, their length, and the character of the adjustment.

3) Successive samples must then be taken in each of these departments to determine whether observed changes fall within statistical limits or whether the conditions of equilibrium hold for the department, for a group of departments or for the company as a whole. This can be done in the latter case by treating only relations between departments, disregarding the internal relations in a first approximation.

4) Where the quantitative character of the relations is changing, more detailed analysis of the samples will tell whether the source of the change is in a particular process, for example, producing a bottleneck, whether it is due to one or more individuals who are abnormal or unable to fit into the group, etc.

5) Once the source of changes is discovered, calculations can then be made as to whether the process can be modified to fit the capacities of the persons involved, whether the material flow can be stabilized or whether a transfer of a person who cannot adapt to these changes is necessary. If an assembly line is being disturbed by people who operate at too high or too low a speed for the others, substitutes whose rates are more comparable can be selected to put into the team. On the level of management, inadequate leadership will turn up in the same way, where sudden changes are not met by sufficient activity on the part of the supervisor to restore the equilibrium; where there is too great an isolation between higher and lower management so that progressive disturbances in line departments are buffered at the level of the first-line supervisors, disturbing them, but being passed down the line again. All such changes can be made, if it is realized that changes in routines, as well as changes in personalities are all potentially disturbing factors.

6) Once an organization is brought into a state of equilibrium as tested by the fact that variation in the frequencies of the relationships varies within determinable limits, or to put it another way, minor disturbances once they are removed are followed rapidly by a return of the rates to their previous state, then the system can be used for purposes of control. When the periodic sampling determines that changes are occurring outside the normal limit of variation, executive action is immediately called for. If such action involves a change in process, in methods of keeping costs, in supervision, then serious disturbance of the equilibrium can be avoided if the change is introduced in terms of the existing system of relations. If a team has been working well together and a new process is to be introduced, the same members of the team would be utilized in approximately the same relationships, and if workers are to be added or subtracted, the working system of the team needs to be taken into account.

7) Control systems can also be used in those cases in which the system of relations has actually attained an equilibrium, but one which from the point of view of efficient operation is costly and a definite liability. In such a case, as for example when the rate of production of a team or a department is below standard, the equilibrium has to be disturbed and a new state of equilibrium reached. Analysis of the existing state of affairs in the department may show that one or two persons dominate the situation and need to be transferred to a situation where they

can adjust without making the operations inefficient. A new supervisor often has to be brought in, particularly if new methods have been introduced, and the old foreman is unable to change his routines and those of his workers. In such a case, when a change has been made, successive sampling of the department will show whether the changes introduced actually are bringing about the desired state of equilibrium, whether the system is returning to its old and inefficient state or whether it is attaining a new and less desirable state of equilibrium. In the same way, when major changes are going on in the society at large, their effect upon the organization can be measured directly. By such means, management can determine whether and at what point changes need to be introduced to meet the new situation. They can thus avoid taking hasty action based on guesses as to what they think the situation ought to or might mean to the organization; they can base their decision upon knowledge of what is actually happening in their organization.

A few years ago, a great deal was heard of the stretch-out in the textile industry, the process by which workers who were tending twelve looms, let us say, were now asked to tend twenty. From a technical point of view, the program was quite feasible, and in fact quite necessary, because business was bad, and reduction in costs was a necessity, if the industry was to survive. Almost universally, however, the process of introducing the stretch-out was met with opposition by labor. It disturbed already established routines to which the workers had become accustomed, and through which they retained their equilibrium. Moreover, the process resulted in the elimination of some of the workers, and even though some plants tried to absorb the surplus labor elsewhere this produced a serious upset in the whole network of relations in the plant. Management endeavoured to justify these changes in terms of the logic of efficiency. They quoted the statements of their engineers that the tending of extra looms would be well within the individual's capacity, and in fact would enable the individual to make a little more money. There was widespread dissatisfaction and a wave of strikes. The fact of the matter is that no effort was made in most cases to find out what the organizational structure of the factory was and to adapt the stretch-out to fit the human relations involved. Even where elaborate studies were made to determine an equitable workload, and an extensive process of retraining was undergone to enable the workers to perform the operations more efficiently, it was not realized that the process of making the studies, the extensive retraining, and the installation of the stretch-out involved disturbance after disturbance to the equilibrium of the workers. If this had been understood, and a control system had been at hand, such improvements in technical efficiency could have been carried out in terms of a systematic plan for the whole organization, rather than by a series of arbitrary actions which upset all the individuals concerned. Moreover, the periodic sampling would have enabled management to detect when these disturbances were becoming too great, when the tempo was becoming too fast, where there were individuals whose compensatory reactions to the changes were upsetting their departments.

At the present time with the speed-up due to national defense, we are witnessing an analogous situation. People who have been working at an accustomed rate of speed and whose adjustments both to one another and to management had attained some state of balance have suddenly had their routines disturbed. Many of them have had to learn new jobs as war products have been substituted for the products they were used to. In those plants in which organization was bad, where disturbances in the relations of management and workers have been sporadically occurring throughout the last decade, the changing rate resulting from the disturbance of the war effort has seriously upset the precarious equilibrium existing in the plants. The changes in the relationships within the organization has been accompanied by increased emotional disturbances, and resulted in struggles to attain a new state of equilibrium. Where the organization structure was not properly constructed to allow the individuals to adjust to the changes in relationships and in rates of activity, conflict has inevitably arisen. Unless definite steps are taken to do something about eliminating or adjusting these organizational weaknesses, the national effort will be seriously impeded.

The solution to organizational problems is not to wave the flag and try to force labor to behave unlike human beings. For the process of force itself will accentuate the difficulties it seeks to cure. For whether or not strikes occur is not of itself the most important aspect of the industrial situation so long as the situations which produce strikes are still in operation. For these situations, deriving from inefficient organizational structure, impede production even where actual outbreaks may not appear. Where organization is poor, where teamwork is not characteristic of the workings of a company,

the rate of production is far lower than it could be. This is the most important consequence of our inattention to organization problems.

We have always prided ourselves in the United States on the fact that our industry is the most efficient technically in the world. All of us have learned that inefficient machinery causes waste and loss of effort. But too few of us realize that many of our industries, priding themselves on the latest machinery and the most advanced technical processes, depend for their supervision and coordination on a hidebound, ineffectual organizational structure, full of bottlenecks, acting continually at cross purposes.

NATIVE ECONOMY AND SURVIVAL IN ARCTIC ALASKA

Froelich Rainey



After map in Atwood's "The Physiographic Provinces of North America"
Courtesy of Ginn and Company

Experiments in social and economic planning for Alaska and its people have become well known during the past few years particularly because of the now famous Matanuska colony and also, to a lesser extent, because of the present conservation policy of the Department of Interior. But there is one such experiment, begun nearly fifty years ago, which is little known outside the territory. This is the introduction of domestic reindeer which, it was thought, might revive the Eskimo population of the far northwest, a population sadly depleted after the heyday of baleen whale hunting during the last two decades of the past century. It has not succeeded nor yet has it been a complete failure, and all concerned agree that a future success depends upon a sound policy of administration. Furthermore, it is apparent that the development of such a policy will depend upon a clear understanding of the native culture during the past century. Such a situation offers a test case of our ability to apply anthropological data in reformulating an experiment which, it is hoped, may rehabilitate the native population.